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Book Reviews
The Creative Imagination: Enlightewment to Romanticism by James Engell.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981. Pp. xix

+ 416. $16.00.

This book is a study of the history of the idea of imagination from the
end of the seventeenth to the beginning of the nineteenth ·century in England,
Scotland, and Germany. The British thinkers range from Hobbes to Coleridge,
and' the German from Leibniz to Schelling. There is a cursory glance at a
few American writers of this time, but writers of the French enlightenment are
omitted because they "did not originate or develop the idea of the imagination
in the same fashion nor to the same extent" (ix-x) as writers in England,
Scotland, and Germany.
I wish to begin this review with a discussion of the last chapter, entitled
II Coleridge."
This is the climax of the book, and all that precedes leads to it.
Indeed, Coleridge the writer and thinker makes" imagination" a central concept
and Engell does justice to the various meanings this idea has for Coleridge;
he reveals the limitations of this idea and how Coleridge came to see some
of its dangers as a substitute for religion. Engell relates Coleridge's views of
imagination as these came to embrace subsidiary ideas and he traces the decline
of this concept in the last fifteen years of Coleridge'S life, years in which he
tried "to reconcile the Dynamic Philosophy with traditional Christianity."
This exposition is one of the best we have of Coleridge on imagination. It
is a model of what the book could have been.
This is an ambitious work; certainly we have no study of the subject that
is as detailed. Nor do we have any modern work that makes such claims for
the idea of imagination itself: "During the eighteenth century the effort to
define-to create-an idea of the imagination permitted and encouraged a critical
survey of the entire creative process and of the history of literature and the arts.
Such an opportunity was unprecedented. The immediate result was that the
creative imagination emerged as the central value of the late eighteenth century
and of Romanticism n (vii). Imagination, writes Engell at the conclusion
of his Preface, I< is now considered, ,vithout question, the supreme value of art
and literature" (x). Such a generalization seems more than the evidence
warrants, especially since the very idea of the imagination as it presently exists
is held to be inadequate. Edward S. Casey writes in Imagining (1976), "It is
above all in existing theories of imagination that one finds the most telling
instances of failure to distinguish between imagining and other sorts of mental
acts, a failure based on an underlying descriptive inadequacy."
Engell may inflate the idea of imagination in our time, but he is surely right
in arguing that imagination was one of the central concepts used to explain
the creation of literature at the beginning of the nineteenth century. His
study deserves careful scrutiny both as a reference work for statements about
the imagination and as a history of an idea. Considering the knowledge
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the author commands of his subject and the writing and thinking of which
he is capable, I am disappointed to find the book marred by two serious flaws.
The first is the use of selective citation to make his case, and the second is a
progressive or additive view of history. These are flaws that repeatedly
call into question the adequacy of the history Engell tells.
(1) Selective Citation. One of the most valuable contributions Tbe O'eative
Imagination makes is in its presentation of an immense body of statements about
the subject, including a considerable number by German theorists, who arc
introduced as significant figures and studied in detail. Still, the quotations that
are given from British critics, for example, do raise doubts about the interpretations
and conclusions drawn from them. Such doubts arise from interpretations of
the evidence that are frequently unsupported, sometimes resulting in contradictory statements; the quotations often prove to be partial statements which
when examined in context provide qualifications that are omitted; the references
to poems and prose are made without attending to the functions of the different
forms of writing.
With regard to unsupported statements that can lead to contradictions,
consider the following t\vo sentences in the text: "Hume keeps the faculty of
judgment outside the sphere of imagination. Imagination may produce fictions or
beliefs, but even beliefs are of a lower surety than' ideas of the judgment'" (55).
And the sentence in which Hume is claimed to support the belief that the
imagination alone creates our picture of reality; "Bed:eley's belief that the
mind alone creates reality appealed to Blake, and although opposed to Blake
and Berkeley in other respects, Hume had said essentially the same thing: the
imagination alone creates our picture of reality" (247). This is not only
a mistake about Hume's position, but it appears to be based on Hume's
"Dissertation on the Passions" (1757), which was a ,vatered down version of
Book II of the Treatise and which is not a work on epistemology or the nature
of reality. Or consider the statement that "no major author before the
Romantics is more concerned with the imagination or devotes to the subject
a larger share of his work than Johnson in his writing on human nature. He
especially probes the human imagination in the ten years from Tbe Vanity
of Human TVisbes (1749) through the essays in the Rambler, Adventurer, and
Idler to Rasselas (1759)" (58). But Johnson does not set this as his aim, not
even in Rasselas; and Engell's example of The Vanity Of Human Wishes may
stand as an instance of interpreting evidence to suit his argument: "The theme
of Johnson's poem The Vanity of Human Wishes and of most of his moral
essays is the necessary and constant cleansing and rectifying of the 'hunger
of imagination' through reason, religion, and the stability of fact" (61). But
surely this reworking of Juvenal into the Christian tradition of belief, discipline,
and self-denial is not a study of the "imagination."
I do not believe any deliberate distortion is involved in this claim, but I
do think it is an effort to sho,,,,, that imagination was central to writers who
primarily analyzed its dangers, as Johnson did in Rasselas. This bias probably
accounts for the omissions in quotations that would qualify the statement
Engell makes. He nvice quotes the opening of Rambler 60, the first time saying,
"Charity or compasion would tlQt be possible without imagination" (61): and
later
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The idea of imaginative sympathy struck home even to Johnson, usually
wary of the imagination as a guide. In Rambler 60 (October 13, 1750),
he makes a sweeping assertion: II All joy or sorrow for the happiness or
calamities of others is produced by an act of the imagination, that realizes
the event ... by placing us, for a time, in the condition of him whose
fortune we contemplate; so that we feel ... whatever emotions would be
excited by the same good or evil happening to ourselves." (149)
But if one puts in what the ellipses omit, it becomes apparent that Johnson
(in Rambler 60, which deals with biography) is discussing responses to narratives:
Ie All joy or sorrow for the happiness or calamities of others is produced by an
act of the imagination, that realises the event however fictitious, or approximates
it however remote, by placing us, for a time, in the condition of him whose
fortune we contemplate; so that we feel, while the deception lasts, whatever
emotions would be excited by the same good or evil happening to ourselves"
(my italics). Johnson is urging that biographical writing deal with those
events that can be readily adopted by readers because by doing so "we
can more readily adopt the pain or pleasure proposed to our minds, by
recognising them as once our own, or considering them as naturally incident
to our state of life."
The selective use of citations, while understandable, does give a false picture
of what the cited critic is saying. For example, the author quotes a passage
from Burke's essay "On Taste" in the second edition of the Inquiry which
begins, "The mind of man possesses a sort of creative power of its own ..." and
precedes it with the remark that the imagination "has a power to reorder
experience and to cast nature in a new mould" (71). But in unquoted sentences
from the same passage Burke says just the opposite, that" it must be observed,
that the power of the imagination is incapable of producing anything absolutely
new; it can only vary the disposition of those ideas it has received from the
senses."
These are representative instances, but they do raise questions about the
interpretations of the citations, which seem to be selected by the premise of
history as progression. I give one final example: in his discussion of Shelley,
Engell writes, "Poetry, says Shelley in the Defence, 'acts in a divine and unapprehended manner, beyond and above consciousness.' The poet becomes an
instrument of a higher melody" (261). But regardless of what Shelley may
say elsewhere, this quotation refers to unappreciated poetry in the infancy
of the world which gets to be appreciated by future generations. The full
quotation is as follows:
In the infancy of the world, neither poets themselves nor their auditors are
fully aware of the excellence of poetry: for it acts in a divine and un-apprehended manner, beyond and above consciousness; and it is reserved
for future generations to contemplate and measure the mighty cause and
effect in all the strength and splendour of their union.
One of the dangers in tracing the history of an idea is the temptation
to disregard the contexts in which the idea appears. It is a temptation that
can be, but is not always, resisted. The author finds, for example, that The
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Prelude does not say much more, philosophically or critically, about the
imagination than Akenside's Pleasure of tbe Imagination, a poem based on
Addison's Spectator papers on this subject.

The Prelude is a vindication of the attitude that imagination permeates life.
And without this personal testament we would miss a closing link in this
history of the idea: The Prelude does not, in a specifically philosophical
or critical sense, say much more about the idea of the imagination than
Akenside's Pleasures. But the individuality and the connected experiences
in The Prelude are among the reasons why it is far greater. The idea
becomes humanized. (266)
Here is an instance in which the author's interest in the history of an idea
seems to mislead him about the two different kinds of poetry, between a
didactic poem and an autobiographical narrative. Is it not reasonable to
assume that the "philosophy" of poetry exists in its form as well as in its
overt discourse and that different forms imply concepts that need to be
discriminated despite the similarities they share with other texts?
(2) Engel/'s Concept of History. It may well be that one of the reasons
the author does not recognize this difference is that he considers the
history of imagination to be additive or progressive. In his Preface he
puts it this way: II As an idea, the imagination grew by constant additions;
each important .figure in the advenntre of this idea read scores of other
writers. Yet there was a continual sense of affinnation, of preserving and
not denying what had been stated before, and then enlarging on it" (vii).
The consequence of this view of history is that Engell argues for a consistent
and continuous development of the idea of II imagination" from Hobbes,
Locke, and Leibniz to Coleridge, and minimizes or disregards the resistance to
particular positions. It would be difficult from this history to grasp the
differences between Locke and Leibniz and to know, that Kant opposed both
empiricism and rationalism and sought a synthesis that was a significant recasting
of these positions.
Engell is not unaware of discontinuities in the idea of the imagination. But
this realization does not lead him to change the kind of history he writes. In fact,
it constitutes a kind of self-conscious afterthought.
In the end, too, we must realize our tendency to look at remarks on the
imagination for a clarifying and simplifying statement. We find dead-ends,
labyrinths, and mazes. The vocabulary becomes unsteady, the definitions
weak and unstable. But there is also a bright side to this situation. If nothing
else, the confusion and the struggles of the best thinkers and writers of
the Enlightenment and the Romantic period indicate what a powerful,
complex, and subtle force the imagination is. (136)
This statement could have formed the basis of a history of the imagination
that would have provided a more acute understanding of this concept than
is actually offered. This is unfortunate since Engell has done more work
on this idea than anyone else who has written about the Enlightenment. But
he has not seriously confronted what this passage means in terms of a history
as progress. If he had, his history would have taken account not merely of
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additions but of dead ends as well, not merely progress but "the confusion
and struggles of the best thinkers and writers of the Enlightenment and the
Romantic period" showing "what a powerful, complex, and subtle force the
imagination is."
Engell makes amply clear what different, even contradictory, meanings were
given to "imagination," both in Britain and Germany. But he does not write
his history in terms of the problems particular philosophers were seeking
to solve and what part imagination played in their inquiries. Rather, he
proceeds by analyzing what they said only about imagination-with some
exceptions such as Schelling and Coleridge. For this reasOD, even when
he ,writes of philosophers like Leibniz and Locke, both are seen as developers
of the imagination, and he gives Hobbes the position of initiator. This distorted
view of philosophical history is especially obvious in the discussion of Kant:
"For on the nature of imagination, Kant stands largely on the shoulders of
Tetens [Johann Nicolaus Tetens (1736-1807)] ..." (118).
Mr. Engell sees no pronounced break between the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries with regard to theories of the imagination. He persuasively
links "associations of ideas," "sympathy," "genius" to imagination, and, in
doing so, displays a command of ideas in the period. But here, again, his
history is not clear about how or why such interconnections exist. He wishes
to date certain facets of the idea of imagination from mid-century though he
is not always precise about dates. On page 151 he writes, "Now, starting in
the 1760s and 1770s, the poet's sympathetic power began to be seen as an adjunct
of his imagination, and critical thinking increasingly explored this relationship."
But on page 256 he finds that concepts of sympathy were explored ten years
earlier: "Much of what Shelley says explicitly about the imagination is a ringing
of the changes, in a high and impelling rhetorical mode, on ideas evolving
and intertwining since Adam Smith and Alexander Gerard began to explore
the concepts of sympathy and genius in the 1750s and 1760s." The 1770s are
sometimes seen as the beginning of new ideas and sometimes as a plateau
in which new ideas were not developed despite the fact that Britain and
Germany in the last quarter of the eighteenth century were sharing ideas
of the imagination: "From the early 17705, half a dozen years before Tetens'
Pbilosophische Versuche and almost ten years before Kant's first Critique,
Herder stirred the currents of new ideas" (115). Later in the book,
however, he declares, "But we should note that before the 18208 America,
too, like England and Scotland from the late 1770s to the early 1790s, was
on a plateau" (189).
My wish is not to show trivial discrepancies (who, after all, is guiltless of
these) but to point out that Engell's view of history as progress, by neglecting
oppositions or resistances or qualifications, leads to ambiguities in interpretation. Apparently the author does not subscribe to Frye's view of an
"age of sensibility" or to period tenus like "neoclassicism," but a developmental history ought not eliminate the possibility of distinguishing crucial
changes from minor ones. Which additions to the ideas of imagination
could be considered developments of a norm, which the overturning of a
norm? Hobbes and Leibniz become crucial figures in this history, but
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does Hume's view of the imagination derive from theirs?
Indeed, the
author's use of the terms "influence," " hints," "parallel" seems, at the
very least, problematic.
As a result of emphasizing progression, Engell has to argue for continuity
i I even when it does not exist-as witness the case of Johnson. And he has
I' to minimize or reduce or ignore oppositions. Early in the book he declares,
i
"The figure of Newton, as Wordsworth describes him 'Voyaging through
i! strange seas of Thought, alone,' had become for many eighteenth-century
thinkers a symbol not so much of reason but of the imagination" (127).
S f
But in noting that Blake attacks Newton, he declares, "Blake aims a heavy
verbal artillery on the earlier eighteenth century, on Locke and Newton,
I
but he finds few major enemies in English thought after the 1740s and 1750s
when it comes to the idea of imagination" (248). But if Newton had
become a symbol of imagination, Blake must be opposing this particular
view. Blake and Wordsworth disagreed about the imagination, and no
attempt is made to confront either the conflict or the kind of symbolic
imagination Newton stood for.
Engell does describe different views of imagination, but his book lacks
any attempt to show how history involves critics and philosophers and
! poets supporting, rejecting, or confronting one another.
\Vhen Wordsworthin the 1800 "Preface" and in the 1802 "Appendix "-attacks Gray and
I Johnson for their diction, he does so because the diction of poetry is in itself
I
characteristic of certain ideas that he "\vishes to oppose. It seems reasonable
to assume that Wordsworth does not share the view of imaginative language
held by the earlier poets. In consequence of its view of history as progression,
The Creative Imagination tends to reduce differences, to give a harmony to
human actions that they do not possess.
A history that describes but does not analyze ideas leaves the reader
with a vague notion of what different thinkers take the imagination to be.
I have earlier criticized the selective citations, but I wish to indicate that
! without a sense of the loose usage of an idea, we can have only an
I inadequate sense of which of its aspects is undergoing development. Engell
knows this; he is, however, more interested in tracing continuities than
discontinuities. One of his procedures is to chart progress by showing that
critics use similar terms. Referring to Blake, for example, he declares, "The
universe is a construct of the imaginative power that is in both God and
man, and when man realizes this, he has taken the first step to truth and
salvation. Similar ideas appear in Akenside, Tucker, Thomas Brown, and
Coleridge" (244). But such ideas are not couched in the language of Blake,
nor do they form part of the same mythology, nor do they lead to the same
kind of writing.
I have spent most of this review documenting the two major flaws, although
I have also sought to make clear the extensive research the boole contains. This
research is most prominent in the Gennan tradition that Engen outlines.
The book as a whole is divided into six parts \vhich proceed more or less
chronologically: "Part One. Probing the Source," "Part Two. A Broader
Stage," "Part Three. The Gennan Foundation," "Part Four. Faith in
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the Imagination," "Part Five. Literary Explorations," "Part Six. Harmony
of Being." In the last part, which contains discussions of Schelling and
Coleridge, we find the most rewarding sections.
Coleridge's view of the imagination is described as follows:
The imagination, as it integrates the whole mind, is "an intermediate
faculty, which is at once both active and passive," influencing and influenced
by each faculty simultaneously. Then, by translating all mental activity
into images or symbols, the imagination produces language that contains
the whole potential or "potentized" mind. The understanding grasps tlus
language and uses it for commuication. Without our imagination-created
language, we arc defeated and lost-bereft, as Hobbes said, of civilization.
(399)

Coleridge was immersed in the imagination as power, and Engell shows how
Coleridge stepped back from the implications of the Godlike role he attributed to it. But how much of Coleridge's view is appropriate as an analysis
of imagination? How adequate is his description of the mind's creative
act? Is our consciousness, our writing, a result of "one organic and harmonious pr-ocess" (339)? Do not our epiphanic moments occur outside the
harmony that 'Coleridge posited? Is his description adequate to explain the
interrelation between individual and communal imaginative acts?
Engell is right in assuming that Blake, Coleridge, and Shelley identified
"imagination" with all creative acts. But were they correct in doing so?
Of course, if one writes of the "creative imagination," it is not identical
with declaring that the imagination is creative. And Engell acknowledges
the "uncreative" views of the imagination. But what precisely are the
" creative" functions of the imagination with. respect to learning, speaking,
thinking?
Such questions arise because Engell's work is so wide-ranging and provocative. In opening up the German tradition in the history of an idea,
he has made it possible for scholars to do in detail for minor writers what
he has done for Coleridge. In this sense, the work ought to call forth
new scholarship. It is bound to serve as a valuable reference work for those
who study the eighteenth-century and Romantic imagination. It illustrates
the pervasiveness and interconnectedness of imagination with other ideas.
But as a history, it -will need to be reimagined. The chapter on Coleridge
stands as a model of what such reimagining might be.
RALPH COHEN

University of Virginia

Imitation and Pmise in the Poems of Ben Jonson by Richard S. Peterson. New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981. Pp. xxi + 247. $18.50.
Richard .S. Peterson has produced a well-turned study to which Jonson
scholars "\VIU not only turn but also return for some years. They will
return to reconsider his theory of humanist and Jonsonian imitation for
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writing and for living, to learn from his additional supply of Jonson's
sources and analogues, and to enjoy his perceptive, intricate, and learned
readings of Janson's laudatory poetry and his suggested interpretations of
Jonson's other works. Moreover they will recommend that their colleagues
and students turn to Peterson's study to enjoy watching two interesting
minds at worlc-Jonson creating by transforming the past and Peterson
recreating by recovering that tradition. For Peterson's major task is inventing
(perhaps in our sense, certainly in the Renaissance rhetoricians' sense) a
context in which to read Jonson and other classically and morally based
poets.
To engage his study Peterson has focussed on Jonson's imitation-not on
the familiar translation or adaptation, allusion or echo, genre or topos, diction or
syntax, rhythm or scheme, but rather on the metaphoric and moral development of art and life. Peterson assumes, with no inconsiderable number of
examples, that metaphors in a very physical sense do inform poetry and
can shape lives. Thus in his study of Jonson's poems of praise those honored
and addressed take sl12.pes that arc then moralized-William Roe as an alembic,
Sir Thomas Roe as a colunm, Sir Kenelm Digby as a palace, Venetia Digby
as a temple, Sir William Uvedale as a cabinet, Sir Henry Morison and Lucius
Cary, Viscount Falkland as the dioscuri, Shakespeare as a lance, and even
Ben Jonson himself as a vase. Such metaphors, through connotations and
puns, carry tremendously greater complexity and suggestiveness than new
images. For Jonson turned such metaphors out, according to Peterson, by
reading, assimilating, and recreating them, by excavating, digesting, and
transforming them from classical masterworks into seventeenth-century poems
of praise. Peterson's thesis, then, is that Jonson wrote .by rediscovering
and reinventing the 1.vitty metaphors latent in and repeatedly refined through
literature of the past, and by applying these complex ,vitty metaphors to
subjects in the present so as to restore and expand both metaphors and the
human moral potential they honor and communicate. Moreover, both the
Renaissance poet and his twentieth-century critic would seem to maintain
that such activity makes the classics, and indeed the literature and life of any
era, worthwhile.
To further focus his study Peterson has concentrated on Jonson's poems
of praise-on taus rather than on the satiric vitupemtio more often discussed
by students of Jonson's idea of imitation and lyrics. Nor does Peterson deal
with all the poems of praise. Instead, first he outlines Jonson's general theory
inside the context of other Renaissance theories of imitation and describes
Jonson's aesthetics and moral practice of imitation by interpreting Jonson's
theory through pronouncements, masques, and plays, as well as poems,
suggesting all along full readings of shore poems addressed to Camden,
the Roes, Digbys, Rutlands, and others. Next he presents intensive and
extensive paradigmatic readings of "An Epistle Answering to One that
Asked to Be Sealed of the Tribe of Ben," "To the Memory of My
Beloved, the Author Mr. William Shakespeare: And What He Hath Left Us,"
and "To the Immortall Memorie, and Friendship of that Noble Paire, Sir
Lucius Cary, and Sir H. Morison." Peterson's evidence and his mode of
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operating call to mind Rosemond Tuve and D. C. Allen-but with additions.
Besides tracing image clusters through classical poems, emblem books, contemporary literature, and Jonson's own works, he also traces them through
the works of moral philosophy. Thus Peterson is likely to cite an image
in varying forms and interpretations in Plato, Cicero, Plutarch, Quintilian,
AU50niuS, and lVIacrobius, as well as in Horace, Seneca, Martial, and Juvenal,
in Bacon as well as in emblem writers and major and minor Renaissance poets.
Here we might like to have more contemporary support from Renaissance
dictionaries, commentaries, and editions.
Beyond interpreting the poem itself in its tradition, Peterson extends the
moral implications of the image patterns through Jonson's aesthetics and
the ideal life he tried to promote. Thus Peterson's readings become readings
of an ideal moral stance for a particular society as well as of individual
poems, a genre, and an aesthetic stance. Here we might like to learn more
about Jonson's relationship to the actual people and society he addresses.
But both of his extensions of metaphorical readings of lyrics make Peterson's
work all the more valuable-as a study of Jonson's poems of praise and as a
model for other influence studies to come.
vVith learning and insight Peterson has also \vittily and gracefully returned
to Jonson and Jonson's sources to shape his own well-turned study on
the complex metaphorical design underlying Jonson's sense of the classical
ode. The turn, the counter-turn which completes the circle, and the stand,
along with the complex web of connotations and puns these suggest, carry
into Peterson's design and style, endowing it with an elegant formal structure
and making it a persuasive exemplum of the very metaphors he is considering.
In brief, Richard S. Peterson's important new study of Jonson's verse
offers scholars valuable new sources for Jonson's poetry; more, it offers
splendid if occasionally overwrought interpretations of a number of central
Jonson poems and still more suggestions about how to read many Jonson
works in a new context of imitation for writing and for living; most, it
offers an extended model for influence studies which moves far beyond formal
patterns to social concerns and ethical positions. In closing Peterson's volume
we might like very much to see a greater synthesis accounting for other
patterns and arguments besides metaphorical ones and including satiric epigrams
as well as paeans inside epideictic; we might even want a summa accounting
for Jonson's whole monument of theory, poems, masques, and plays founded
on his notion of imitation. But we can scarcely ask for a more informative,
useful, or delightful study than Peterson's, to \vhich the authors of any such
syntheses will have to return to reread, digest and transform, and build upon.
rnA CLARK

University of Florida
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English Dramatic Form, 1660-1800: An Essay in Generic History by Laura
Brown. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981. Pp. xvi +
240. $19.50.

Brown's interesting and provocative essay addresses, as she says, both historical and conceptual problems. She traces the evolution of dramatic form
in both serious and comic plays over a hundred-year period that witnessed
major formal changes in drama, the decline of drama in the eighteenth
century, and the concurrent rise of the novel.
Brown's conception of formal history is based largely on R. S. Crane's
"Critical and Historical Principles of Literary History" (The Idea of the
Humanities [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1967], II, 45-156). Unlike
many recent critics of Restoration and eighteenth-century drama, Brown
discerns both direction in the development of drama and shape in its history.
She believes that "it is not only possible but essential to find a means of
organizing and classifying" the drama of the period, and that this can
best be done by examining major works, which "are more representative of
their genre and of their period than minor or average worles because they
come closer to fulfilling the potential of their form. They grasp the
realities of their age more fully, and they embody its concerns and contradictions more fully."
The form of Restoration and eighteenth-century
drama, Brown says, "can be most generally described as a coherent fiction."
In morc specific terms, "these plays are actions, constructed from the unfolding
conflicts and relationships among characters whom we understand according
to our evaluation of them in the terms of their represented fictional world."
These actions can vary according to evaluative terms propounded, characters
and conflicts represented, and relationships among "characters' deserts and
fates." These conceptions of form and action, indebted to the work of
Crane, Sheldon Sacks, and Ralph Rader, are thoroughly "neo-Aristotelian,"
but Brm;vn's methodology depends on a further theoretical assumption that
she says is less neo-Aristotelian-the idea that "literary form is ultimately
imprinted with the ideology of the age." But this is not a major departure
from neo-Aristotelian concepts of form. Central to Crane's definition of form,
for example, is the notion that a literary work carries values or norms by
which the worth of characters and actions are evaluated; it is a small
additional step to trace those values to the ideology of a given age, and
even that step is unnecessary when operative values are universal, which
is the case with many values in eighteenth-century drama and some in Restoration drama. When they are local (tied, for instance, to a particular code
of honor or social class), as more frequently happens in the Restoration, it
is useful to trace them to specific ideological sources, although any coherent
individual literary work contains values that are accessible without reference
to an external ideology. Brown's manner of tying literary form to the ideology
of its historical period, hmvever, is very helpful in increasing our understanding of the broad issues of generic history in the Restoration and
eighteenth century since the moral forms of the latter depend on bourgeois
values that differ radically from the aristocratic values of Rcstoration social
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faons. She is more concerned \vith the very general shift of values that
took place between the Restoration and the mid-eighteenth century than
with particular events of social or political history because the former
ultimately tell us morc about changes in generic history. And, as she says,
these historical forces "appear only at the periphery" of her discussion and
arc subordinated to more strictly literary analysis.
Her analysis begins by defining formal categories based on examinations of
individual plays, and her further analysis of the relatiol1::.hips among these
categories forms the basis of her history of drama in the period. She
demonstrates convincingly that serious and comic drama throughout the
period, responding to the same historical forces, undergo parallel and related
processes of formal change. Restoration audiences, for example, need not
have been schizophrenic in responding to such apparently dissimilar plays as
The Conquest of Grff7wda and Tbe Country lVife since they in some senses
resemble each other more than the latter resembles an eighteenth-century
comedy. Heroic action and dramatic social satire, the two major forms Brown
identifies in the period from 1660 to 1677, are alike in that both base their
actions on aristocratic social standards of assessment, the former on a precise
honor code and the latter on contemporary genteel manners. Neither form
is static within this period. Early heroic plays affirm the governing aristocratic
code unambiguously, but later ones evince a (( fragmentation" of the code or
contain radical protagonists who violate it. Restoration dramatic social satire
depends on the "discrepancy between the social assumptions that are expressed explicitly in the working out of the action and the dramatist's implicit
moral position." There is a greater degree of discrepancy between the
represented social context and the dramatist's implicit moral judgment in
Wycherley than in Etherege, for example. Both forms, Brown argues,
establish limits on options available to future playwrights by failing to provide
alternatives to the status quo because of limited social scope, and by adopting
dramatic assumptions that preclude complexity of character development.
The forms Brown identifies in the period from 1677 to 1707 are affective
tragedy and transitional comedy. The defining characteristic of the former is
its "dependence upon the audience's pitying response "; "action and meaning
depend upon the affective power of the protagonist's plight." Hence pity
replaces admiration. In transitional comedy, the social assessment of dramatic
satire begins to he replaced by evaluations based on characters' inner moral
worth. Brown argues that transitional comedy does not have a coherent form
of its own since there can be no formal middle ground between social satire and
moral action. The former assumes that audiences will examine critically what
is presented on stage, whereas a moral action expresses directly the morality of
its audience. Transitional comedy is "a coherent collection of individual
responses or capitulations to the forces of generic change." Hence transitional
comedy (Shad'\vell, Durfey, Southerne, Cibber, Vanbrugh, Congreve, Farquhar)
arises from the "collision of two incompatable modes," often resulting in plays
in which "social and moral are simply juxtaposed." A happy by-product of
this collision is a freedom (exercised by Congreve and Vanbrugh) to experiment
with complex characterization since the introduction of moral values eliminates
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the need for social stereotypes on ,,,hich sarire depends and since the decreased
emphasis on "manners" allows for psychological complexity in characterization.
Hence The lVay of the HI arfd "is uniquely representative of this transitional
drama in its subtle definition of internal motintions and moral values in an
aggressively social context."
The form that dominates the first half of the eighteenth century in both
serious and comic drama is moral action, \vhich directly represents and defines
merit in terms of inner moral worth and assumes a direct identification between
audience and protagonist. The form is implicitly or explicitly didactic and
predominately sentimental and realistic. BrO'wl1 argues that because of the
"self-conscious continuity of dramatic cyolution" (chiefly constraints of characterization and scope), dramatic moral action fails where novelistic moral
action succeeds in surmounting the problem of "achieving a generativc relationship between the moral merit of the exemplary J:hence static] protagonist and the
process of a dynamic action that produces his or her fate." Richardson overcomes the problem chiefly through psychological complexity, Fielding through
social scope.
Brown remarks in her introduction that her task is the difficult one of "reconciling the details of individual texts \'lith the process of literary eyolution."
One of thc best ways to test the value of a generic history is to ask how
useful it is in elucidating the individual texts that fall within its purview.
Brown's excellent study significantly increases our understanding of numerous
plays in the period. Her discussion of the evolution of hcroic action, for
example, yields valuable insights into the nature of Dryden's mature heroic
dramas, m'Llch as her conception of transitional comedy results in a stimulating
reappraisal of Congreve's achievement. But there arc occasions on which her
conceptual terms seem either to encourage misplaced emphases or to disregard
alternative readings. For example, in defining the discrepancy between social
and moral assessment in The Man of kIode, Brown makes too much of Etherege's
"implicit criticism" of Dorimant. Rather than being juxtaposed to Harriet's
"naturalness," Dorimant's social accomplishment complement.') her equal ability
to dissemble and manipulate. Their exchange in III, iii makes it clear that each
is capable (or "guilty") of affected agreeableness. And any sympathy for
Dorimant's cast mistresses is wasted or short-lived; Bellinda, the best candidate for
such sympathy, enters their affair \vith her eyes open, knowing both Dorimant's
nanue and the rules of the game. Similarly, in defining the moral action of
Cato, Bro\YI1 argues that Addison intends audiences to ,'iew his protagonist as
one whose absolute yirtue remains "unqualified and unAinching" from
beg-inning- to end. and that, faced with a static and infallible hero, he resorts to
tri~ker~' in pro\'iding a dynamic plot b~c prox:; (through subsidiary chaf3cters),
thus giying Caw "the credit of a tragic action \\,ithout any of the normally
attendant flaws." C!c\'Cr;lS it is. I think this explanation is misraken. I ha\'e
ar~llcd clsc\\,hcre that the cmphasis of Act V focuscs on Cato's fallibilit),. Moreen'I. shortl~· before composing the LIst act (nine ~'ears after the first four werl'
finished), Addison wrote that ";1 person of an absolutr.: :H1d C0I1S11Il1Ill:1te yirtul'
should ncnr be introduced in tra~edy" (SjJecf,Hor :-':0, 273; Jalluan' 1712)
bCC1l1SC the spectacle of perfect ,'ir;ue'suffering may nise pity but no~ terror,
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since we do not resemble the suffering person. Ultimately, Cato is not a moral
action that attempts to depict an infallible man of unqualified virtue.
A final caveat: perhaps any study that organizes dramatic history in broad
generic categories risks suggesting that its categories arc morc inclusive than
they are. Brown's work traces the major generic shifts in Restoration and
eighteenth-century drama admirably, but there are numerous plays that remain
outside her categories. Many full-length comic and serious plays written after
1700, for example, do not take the form of moral action.
Brown's essay is an jIDportant contribution to the study of Restoration and
eighteenth-century drama and the latter's relationship to the novel. By
example, it also answers some of our questions about how generic history can
and should be approached.
JAMES

S.

1V1ALEK

DePaul University

An E."Cemplary History of the Novel: The Quixotic versus the Picaresque by
Walter L. Reed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981. Pp. vii

+

334. $22.50.

Reflections on tbe Hero as Quixote by Alexander Welsh. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1981. Pp. x + 244. $15.00.
Although Walter Reed and Alexander Welsh proclaim quite different
objectives in their respective discussions of the European-American novel, they
share more than might at first appear evident. In his Reflections on the Hero
as Quixote, W clsh regards Cervantes' hero as the incarnation of an attitude
toward life that he himself has a strong tendency to share. By defining this
attitude and examining variations upon it in the « quixotic" heroes of Joseph
And"ews, Tristram Shandy, The Vicar of 117akefield, Pickwick Papers, The
Nerl.Dcomes, and The Idiot, he has found a vehicle for his own philosophical
speculations on the linkage between individual identity and the pursuit of justice
in an arbitrary and ultimately incomprehensible world. In contrast, Reed
employs Don Quixote and the Spanish picaresque as opposing narrative
possibilities in the history (or" diacritical space") of the novel. Tracing this
opposition through a series of primary examples (Moll Flanders, Joseph Andrews,
Tristram Shandy, Pickwick Papers, Vanity Fair, The Confidence Man, A
Connecticut Yankee in King ArthU1"s Court, Felix Krull, Tl:Je Sot-lVeed Factor,
and Terra Nostra), he advances his thesis that the novel in either of these fonus
is essentially a defiance of established literary tradition and, by extension, a
challenge to conventional modes of thought and behavior.
vVhat conjoins these apparently disparate enterprises is not only the preeminence which they accord to Cervantes' masterpiece. They also share a
common tendency to distance themselves from the New Critical, structuralist,
and deconstructionist approaches which have influenced them in various ways, as
they themselves would undoubtedly admit. Even though Welsh's book is a
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meditation on the nature of life and Reed's is an anti-systematic history of the
novel, both construct their central hypotheses around a Romantic notion of
individuality, which in turn becomes a determining characteristic in their
definitions of literary realism. For Welsh, individuality can be attained by
people who perceive an injustice, attempt to rectify it, and ultimately suffer
pain or humiliation as a consequence of their efforts; such people go beyond
the conventional roles and ethical principles which an existing social order
obliges them to adopt, and in doing so, they become uniquely themselves.
Accounts of tIus equixotic sequence of experiences arc realistic, Welsh contends,
because they correspond with the "way things are."
According to Reed, individuality inheres in the novelistic text which, by its
nature, defies generic constraints and introduces non-literary semantic codes in
an attempt to assert its own novelty and truthfulness in the face of stereotypical,
falsifying conventions from an existing literary tradition. He proceeds to
suggest that the diverse codes and the demands of tradition are reconciled with
these claims to uniqueness in a series of negotiations enacted in the text.
Because these negotiations are governed by a consistent set of priorities, he coins
the term" protocol" to describe them and to denominate what might be regarded
as the identity principle of any given text. Such works are realistic in the
sense that literary traditions and conventions always seem inadequate to the
felt reality of a contemporary period, whereas by striving for uniqueness, the
novel seeks to provide what is missing from tradition and convention.
Like Unamuno and Ortega y Gasset, Welsh uses Quixote and the quixotic hero
as pretexts for elaborating his own philosophy, of life, and it is on this basis
that his "reflections" must ultimately be judged. The major tenents of his
position emerge most clearly in his delineation of a dialectical opposition between the quixotic hero and the historical realist hero, invented by Sir "Valter
Scott and best exemplified by Victor Hugo's Jean Valjean. This opposition, he
argues, is the source of tensions which can be observed in twentieth-century
fictional heroes like Nabokov's Humbert Humbert. However, Welsh himself
finds the historical realist pole of this opposition inadequate to a genuine understanding of the human condition, because it is based on the untenable belief
that history will necessarily sanction individual identity and culminate in a
just situation. For the historical realist hero, quixotism or idealism is no more
than an adolescent state which the mature hero simply outgrows.
However, if "existence is absurd," as Welsh assumes, this attitude represents
a false closure on what can only be an unending search for meaning. The two
types of meaning with which he is most concerned are individual identity and
justice, and his paradigmatic model for discussing them is the quixotic hero.
In both the real world and in the fictional '\vorld of Don Quixote, injustice is
encountered only by accident, and most inj'Ustices simply recede into the
"tangled web" of circumstances in which any attempt to rectify them would
require the perpetration of a new injustice. Yet when injustice penetrates the
individual consciousness and generates an impulse to transform "the way things
are" into" the way things ought to be," the individual begins to sense his own
being apart from the conventional roles and habits he has been conditioned
to accept. And when an individual acts upon this impulse, he is defending the
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principle that the creation of his identity lies in his own hands, although he
may wel] be modelling his behavior on what he considers to be worthy models.
Because the overwhelming power of law, social practice, or physical superiority
often stand in opposition to the impulse toward justice and personal identity,
the individual who pursues them is repeatedly subjected to practical jokes or
to the vicissitudes of circumstance which confront his idealistic aspirations with
the harshness of objective reality. He is made to appear foolish, but there
remains something admirable about him, because he has acted upon noble valuesvalues which remain deeply embedded in the social fabric, despite a widespread
tendency to repress them. Rather than acquiesce in the comforting teleology
which the historical realist hero imposes on the world, the quixotic hero symbolizes the recognition that individuals can find authenticity and uniqueness in
an endless but disciplined resistance to injustice. Within an environment characterized by the" essential arbitrariness of all activity," Welsh concludes, "a
quixotic identity is actually not worth anything, though it may be the only strictly
individual identity that is available." Obviously, he is using the example of
Quixote to illustrate a largely existentalist attitude toward life, and his readers
will have to determine the deg_ree to which his "reflections" correspond to their
own experiences of the world, but, whether or not the quixotic hero can support
such a philosophy, Welsh has successfully outlined a recurrent pattern of
character portrayal in the novel, and he has suggested cogent reasons why
authors like Fielding, Sterne, Goldsmith, Dickens, Thackeray, and Dostoevski
were attracted to it in a form originally devised by Cervantes.
Reed is far less concerned with the philosophical and referential qualities of
literature than he is with the possibility that novels can be studied as readings
of existing texts. Within the larger dialectical process that opposes the novel,
which consistently seeks to assert its individuality and uniqueness in the face
of nco-classical canons and generic rules, he discovers a more limited dialectic
between the quixotic novel and the picaresque novel. Both first appeared in
Golden Age Spain, and both dramatize problems confronted by a new class
of readers-the conflict between high idealism and mundane reality in quixotic
fictions and the opposition between divine transcendence and human degradation
in the picaresque novels. Although he docs not always describe with precision
the ways in which subsequent novels re-enact the quixotic and the picaresque, he
insists that they comprise the "most extensive series of rereadings of the
novel by the novel in European and Westernized literary history."
Such a claim exceeds the limited evidence Reed presents to justify it, but
his larger thesis about the inherently anti-systemic, anti-generic thrust of the
novel is in any case far more provocative, and he is wise to place more emphasis
upon it than upon the quixotic-picaresque opposition to which the bODle's subtitle
draws attention. According to Reed, both Cervantes and writers of early
picaresque fictions recognized that the technology of the printed book opened
the possibility of addressing readers who might not share the nco-classical tastes
of aristocratic audiences and who would vvelcome the novel's assertion of its
independence from them. At the same time, they realized that the autonomy
they gained in this fashion was passed on to their ne\v readers, who would
not feel as constrained in interpreting novelistic texts as they might feel in
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reading traditional works governed by the rules of a prescriptive poetics.
In other words, the authority of the text is displaced from its producer to its
consumer-the "idle reader" whom Cervantes anticipates as a detached
observer of Don Quixote's adventures. Because Cervantes knows that such
readers arc free to amend the "protocol" of a novel, he is also aware that he
has lost some control over the performance of his own creation. Out of this
awareness emerges the possibility of a new author-reader relationship which
serves as an enabling precedent for all subsequent novelists.
This manner of approaching literature is capable of stimulating significant
new insights into the history of the novel. It is unfortunate that Reed did not
utilize it more often in his discussions of individual texts, but his knowledge of
contemporary theory is so eclectic and his readings in primary texts so wideranging that he often pursues interesting digressions rather than focusing on
the main thread of his argument. For the same reason, he occasionally applies
different modes of analysis to different texts. For example, his chapter on
Sterne is essentially a close textual reading which involves character analysis
and the unobjectionable contention that the author's own life was projected into
his fiction. Such an approach is neither original nor immediately relevant to
Reed's overall purpose. Tn contrast, his chapter on Moll Flanders convincingly
relates Defoe's novel to the rise of neo-classicism and the existence of subliterary
popular fiction. The real difficulty with Reed's bool{, however, lies in the
self-contradictory nature of his enterprise, for one cannot write history
without accepting the possibility of referential discourse. Admittedly he counters
tIus criticism in advance by proposing to write an "exemplary" lustory that
eschews evolutionary hypotheses and proceeds by example, but, as Welsh has
shovm in his philosophical meditations on the extrinsic relevance of Quixote's
fictional experiences, history is more than "a tissue of texts" and novels are
more than "readings of earlier novels."
Despite digressiveness and an intertextualist bias, Reed's book is a theoretically
exciting one, for it offers readers the spectacle of an intellectually perceptive,
well-read critic grappling with an extraordinarily complex problem. He may
not have resolved it, but his insights are provocative, and they suggest
numerous avenues for possible future speculation. Welsh's book is less theoretically
provocative, although it may prove attractive to a larger audience for precisely
that reason. The t\VO books do share several underlying" imaginative structures,"
and they do begin with readings of the Quixote as a seminal work in the history
of the novel; however, their goals are different and perhaps incompatible. Yet
that should not deter people from picking up either book. Both are capable
of engaging the serious reader in a lively intellectual dialogue.
RICHARD

The Ohio State University

in,

BJORNSON
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Literary Democracy: The Declaration of Cultural Independence in America by
Larzer ZitI. New York: The Viking Press, 1981. Pp. xxv + l3J. $20.00.
Larzer Ziff's Literary Democracy does not break into Qur understanding of
the Jacksonian period in American literature with any fresh news. The specialist will turn through it quickly, admiring the skill of its summarizing, the
deftness of its paraphrase, and leave the book ,vith his judgment of the great
Jacksonian writers unaltered. This particular mythos, the Coming of Age, the
Declaration of Cultural Independence, the Flowering, the Rebirth, has been told
before. In his preface Zift warily poses his precursors, Van Wyck Brooks and
F. O. Matthiessen, and suggests that his approach will span the divergence of
their historical writing. Brooks, it will be remembered, was essentially a
social historian, Matthiessen an aesthetician. Here, then, is Ziff, with Society
(historical remarking) and Literature (interpretation), these two boulders.
For the historian who noes not have a political thesis driving his analysis,
the project of fitting these two boulders together is very hard-and it is even
harder to keep them moving in a synchronized motion. That has always been
a problem in the writing of literary history, and Brooks and Matthiessen can
indeed be seen to represent different resolutions. Ziff, however, does not resolve
this problem; he simply moves back and forth. Two chapters are assigned
to each major figure. Ziff will typically establish a socia-political framework
in the first chapter, and then do a close reading of the respective texts in the
second. Because neithcr the historical information nor the literary interpretation
is surprising, a challenge to received opinion, one begins at length to consider
the questions Ziff did not ask in Literary Democ1'acy, to question his methodology.
What, after all, does "cultural independence" mean? We need somehow to
lmow that before "\ve entertain the question of how it happened bet\Veen 1837
and 1861 in American literature. Those detailed and comprehensive histories of
the concept, Perry Miller's The Raven and The Whale and Benjamin Spencer's
Tbe Quest for Nationality, dcmonstrate conclusively that it was a hot topic
in the Jacksonian period, but how seriously, apart from its presence in contemporary rhetoric, its legendary existence, are we to take it? Whitman begins
with the topic in the 1855 Leaves of Grass, declaring the independence of American
poetry in the preface, but then he finishes the declaration and settles down to his
real subject, 11lyself. There is ironic reference to it in TValden. Melville plays
with the idea in Moby Dick, and savages it in Pierre. It is a trope in the
literature, the American Idea, the American Scholar, an American Art, but what
practically is its stature? "Literary democracy grew from the new nationalism,"
Ziff tells us, and then must explain the alienation of the major Jacksonian writers
from that nationalism. It could just as easily be argued that the concept (or
trope) is anterior, peripheral, and that the importance of Emerson, Thoreau,
Melville and Whitman lies in their ability to transcend the simpleminded
nationalism of their period and become, one by one, cosmopolitan, trans-cultural
writers. Melville's struggle in Moby Dick is with Shakespeare, not Jefferson.
The causative line in Ziff's thinking often falls, one-two-three, too readily into
place. "One is led to the hypothesis," he writes, "that not only did America
need to come into possession of a positive nationalism before a native literature
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could flourish, but that it had to dispossess certain groups in the process so as to
free (if not compel) their children to respond with the weapons of thought."
These are the securities of the literary historian who writes after Trone
and before Foucault. Do not look for an inspection of motive, moral, or plot
in this text. What arc the politics of Zift's Literary Democracy? To which
interpretation of the period does it belong? Ideologically, this study is written
midstream in the post-Parringtonian mainstream. Those" native" writers who
came into the possession of a "positive" nationalism are herein studied. Ziff's
justification for his exclusions is peremptory. Irving, Cooper and Bryant are
"conservatives" who" trim their ",vork to foreign dimensions." We are, as we
read Literm'y Democracy, in the surehanded grip of a positivist. This is a
literary history that ends happily. In this regard, Literary Democ1'acy is an
enjoyable book There are fine moments when a donnish aperc;.:u will be wellturned, Ziff's appreciation of Emerson's critique of the solid English self, for
example, is keenly rendered. Everything is familiar in this history, even the
selection of the tributary texts: Uncle Tom's Cabin, Women in tbe Nineteenth
Century, The .Monks of }lIon!?. Hall, which are roundly reasoned forth. This
is a sensible reading of Hawthorne, the judgment of Margaret Fuller is fair, and
ditto the piece on Poe. Zift's" phonemic" analysis of "Song of Myself" will
strike some as rather labored, but his overall sense of Whitman is sound. So,
with anecdote, with aperc;.:u, he summarizes the relation of Jacksonian literature
to Jacksonian society, shows these particular writers struggling with and expressing certain salient democratic ideas and myths, and the summary is comfortably stated within a finished interpretation. What are the politics of
Literary Democracy? The composition of this study, with its .major and minor
figures, resembles the composition of the present Supreme COUIt.
The problem finally with Litemry Democracy is that it isn't very democratic.
Ziff rereads the canon, minus the conservatives, sans Cooper, and betrays
really a parochial and/or elitist conception of what is in a democratic literature:
essays, meditations, poetry, fiction. Could not onc consider those jewels of
Jacksonian oratory, the vVebster-Hayne debate, the Lincoln-Douglas debate,
eminent examples of a democratic literary art, high symbolic drama? And why
is it that all such liberally inclined literary histories continue to ignore the
relevance of Tbe Book Of }VIormon? Here, take it any way you like, is the
most significant of the homespun masterpieces in the Jacksonian period, a sacred
text" written" by the commonest of all the Jacksonian writers, a preliterate, outof-work seryer, one of the roughs. Joseph Smith would not only invent a
fabulous prehistory for the New World, he would go on to reconstitute, in his
own terms, for his own church, the Declaration of Independence and the
Federal Constitution. Ziff does not explore the range of Jacksonian writing that
lies outside the described field of the American Renaissance. Still, it is pleasurable
to take again that walk around Brooklyn with Whitman and Thoreau, to think
of Thoreau as a porcupine, to go out tramping with Emerson and Carlyle. Ziff
astutely renders these scenes, explains the significance of the event, and
at tIlls level, as informed professorial narrative, Literary Democracy is absorbing.
NEIL SCHMITZ

State University of New York at Buffalo
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Hiers to Dionysus: A Nietzscbean Current in Literary Modernism by John Burt
Foster Jr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. 474. $27.50.

Foster's is a very intelligent and sensitive book, exemplary in its scrupulous,
detailed scholarship and a lucid, tcachcrly treatment of concepts and texts.
Convinced that" if the recent turn towards theory in literary studies has raised
the intellectual level of criticism, it has also undermined our respect for
details" (403), Foster proposes a resolutely empirical attention to what
he calls the "literary legacy" of Nietzsche. Such attention entails a good
deal more than a precise record of facts. By keeping a wary distance from
contemporary views of Nietzsche he hopes to recover the variety of ways
Nietzsche elicits from Gide, Mann, Lawrence and Malraux "shifting and
imaginative sympathies" which must be "rendered in images, characters,
situations and dialogue" (410).
Foster begins with a definition of modernism general enough to accommodate
the variety he seeks while still indicating the central presence Nietzsche \Yill
have within it. "The modernist has a sense of having made a break with the
traditions of the recent past that is more drastic than would have occurred in a
continuous process of growth and development" (3), so he or she is likely to
react to this sense of break by radical experimentation in form (either to
recover the past or to clarify our distance from it) and by a sharp questioning
of all received values. This questioning produces several different ways of
using Nietzsche, often at odds within a single text. The writer will at times
imitate or echo his source, at times engage him in intense rivalry. Similarly the
specific form the connection assumes can be created by anyone of four
alternatives definable by a matrix of possible relations between idea and image
(the source's ideas or images can be rendered by a writer conceptually or as part
of concrete situations). Finally we can distinguish the influence significant
within a literary text by defining "the Nietzschean elements" as they are
"gathered along some interpretive axis within the work like a basic formal
pattern, an underlying thematic concern or assumption, a structural element, or
an autonomous aspect of a larger whole" (147). Such openness to "intrinsic"
complexity in turn justifies a concern almost exclusively with "high-culture"
contexts because the cultural current created by "the sense of a break is not
going to derive in any simple way from historical conditions" (413). Before
we can return literature to society we must understand its complex organization
and social details.
I quote Foster a good deal because a good deal of care has gone into his
specific formulations. This is nowhere more evident than in the book's
central chapter which clarifies the basic network of Nietzsehean ideas that
forms his legacy to modernism. The ideas themselves are common coin for
any reader of Nietzsche. All too uncommon, nonetheless, is the precision
Foster brings to them as he tries to establish the four master concepts
structuring the conceptual forces constituting the Nietzschean current in
Modernism. (Foster offers somewhat inconsistent summaries on pp. 40-41, 417.)
Most obviously resonant for writers is the polaristic model of thinking central
to the birth of tragedy. Foster avoids effusive speculations on the Apollonian
and Dionysiac in order to concentrate on another level of inquiry. He wants us
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to understand how Nietzsche tempts writers to explore dualistic tensions! so he
emphasizes the structural model he establishes. Nietzsche's poles dramatize links
between conceptual and instinctual drives and they articulate crucial differences
I I betvveen negations (when the opposed drives exclude one another) and COll: I traries (where the two forces organize their energies by means of a dynamic
relation to one another). Polar thinking in Nietzsche is not dialectical because
one does not emerge as the negation of another. Thus no Hegelian resolution
is possible. Rather the key contrast is between "polar nullity," a state where
onc force cannot contribute to a larger whole, and "hi-polar unity," a state
I
"possessing greater energy and complexity than either pole" (46). In Greek
! tragedy, for example, there is no synthesis of Apollonian and Dionysiac but a
single agent can experience the forces in poised balance-necessity in form and
form inseparable from the tragic root.
Foster's subsequent categories capture basic ways that Nietzsche transforms
I his initial oppositions into a critical psychology capable of analyzing the
i ills of a culture and of proposing alternatives to it. Once the psychology is
clear, one can move to the portraits, images and myths which give concrete
density to Nietzsche's cultural vision. Such elements in turn take their fullest
strength when seen in relation to the ideal of psychological health which Foster
defines as "aesthetic naturalism." This concept unites the source of drives
in instinct with a teleological element that can be realized as a form of process.
"Health" consists in experiencing the instincts as being satisfied within the
activity of creating complex, integrative forms immanent within the moment.
Nietzsche thus unites aestheticism's cult of art with naturalistic imperatives and
establishes fundamental homologies between psychic and textual forces. lVloreover the immanence inherent in seeing the satisfaction of, instinct as the
root and goal of human forming acts gives Nietzsche a powerful contrastive stance
from which he can clearly indicate the forms of idealism blocking self-realization.
Ressentiment and tragic affirmation play out this drama-the former a reactive
subordination of self to outside pressures and higher values (whose emptiness
breeds a frustrated, objectless violence) and the latter an image of the self
fully confronting all the forces impinging on and testing the individual "viII.
Such conflicts are so fully imagined that the particular forces establish abstract
categories which incorporate basic social and cultural homologues. Foster's
third topic, then, consists of the concepts of nihilism and decadence which carry
these homologies, but often with a mythic elaboration that requires Foster to
attempt a precision Nietzsche "failed to provide": "a decadent culture" can
shape experience to some extent even though its capacity to affirm life fully
and directly "has been lost" (85), while "vith Nihilism "no cultural form
at all is produced" (86) . The latter case is a polar opposite of tragic
affirmation because it consists in facing the universe as total chaos and finding no
cultural or personal forming energy that enables one to affirm life. Similarly
the mind's capacity to think imagistically collapses into fragmented abstractions
and the vague pieties of Wagnerian mysticism.
Foster's transition to his final topic reveals the muted, humane precision of his
style. "So intense is Nietzsche's mood of cultural crisis that even this stern
critic of wishful thinking voices hopes for renewal" (109). In order to grasp
Nietzsche the prophet, the stance modern writers found hardest to take, Foster
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concentrates on the various roles the concept of "will to power" plays in
Nietzsche's efforts to replace "nihilism with coherence, objectivity with
personality" (113). The will to power is attributed to the man of willful
self-mastery, to the man who accepts the assertions of instinct (even to the point
of violence), and to the visionary who can stare down nihilism and create
meanings for the age of anti-Christ. Foster sees clearly how Nietzsche's needs
make him vacillate between imagining power as productive and as coercive
making. And Foster's orientation allows him to preserve the multiple senses
since in this respect Nietzsche becomes a type for the workings of the legacy
that continues to fascinate and to repel. Nietzsche's aesthetic naturalism
captures energies still constructive in an age sceptical of all idealizations. Yet
it 'is impossible not to try to idealize those drives, with the dangerous result of
an aesthetic politics that confuses individual and social forms of organization.
Thus built into Nietzsche's critical power is a fonn of idealization terrifying
to the residues of humanist sensibilty. These contraries make it impossible for
the writers studied to rest content with too facilely Nietzschean a stance.
In his discussions of Nietzsche's ideas, Foster gives brief summaries of
their reception by his novelists. Now, after a brief transitional discussion of
images and myth in Nietzsche, Foster shifts the emphases from idea to image
and from a single network to the various dramatic worlds engendered by a
complexity that demands non-discursive presentation. I cannot here discuss in
detail the readings of Tbe lrmnoralist, Death in Venice, Women in Love,
The Plumed Serpant, Man's Fate, Tbe Walnut Trees of the Altenburg, and
Doctor Faustus. Suffice it to say that as a practical critic Foster is always
interesting, often moving, and occasionally brilliant (lus treatment of what Tadzio
means to Aschenbach, of the cultural tensions IVlalraux deals with, and of the ways
Lawrence uses his "material imagination" in Women in Love are practical
criticism at its very best). Moreover Foster complements his sense of specific
textual dramas by organizing his work into a narrative example of a legacy at
work. Each text is chosen in part because it embodies a specific encounter
with its predecessor's use of Nietzsche. His project also establishes a good
deal more flexibility than most academic critics muster. For by concentrating
on the use and generative force of specific ideas, he need not squeeze his
material into a single thematic structure. Foster's work is often more commentary than interpretation as it fills out the significance of images and scenes,
shows how characers reveal rich psychological complexes, or traces some
feature of an author's rethinking earlier solutions. Correspondingly Foster is
free to perform his own multiple critical selves as he moves between texture
and structure and among stances developed in each of the countries he studies
(especially those represented by Richards, Kermode, and Auerbach).
Such significant virtues cannot be without their cost. I want to raise
the issue of whether even a work as judicious and sensitive as Foster's can achieve
a fully satisfying treatment of influence while subordinating theoretical speCUlation
to a sophisticated form of critical empiricism. Consider first the problem that
vexes all empiricism-how to locate the specific object which establishes concrete
tests for empirical propositions. What concept of force will clarify the path of
transmission from source to the resulting structures? Foster gives us a four-term
matrix for this relationship and he aclmowledges the importance of Nietzsche's
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style. But his critical arguments concentrate on the movement from ideas to
complex images they engender when novelists grapple with them. However
no one is more critical than Nietzsche of so isolating ideas or giving them
causal efficacy. As Foster realizes, a major dimension of Nietzsche's appeal
resides in his producing a relation to ideas compelling to an age obsessed
with psychology. This entails fonus of influence not based on precise concepts
but centered in the seductions and permissions carried in his dramatic stances.
At one pole the effect on his successors derives from an aphoristic style capable
of authenticating any idea by the power of expression. But this engenders a
complementary pathos because the writers are in a position to reflect upon
where the success of style can lead. Triumph seems inseparable from madness
and isolation. And these states may be signs that the ideas fail or signs
that a fully authentic vision cannot exist in society. In either case influence
resides in a personal plight which engenders complex problems of identification.
To follow Nietzsche may be, on his terms, a failure of intellect and will, but
to break from him may be a failure of courage. Instances like these call
our attention to the distinctiveness of Nietzsche's break with the past and the
radical restructuring of our idea of ideas that accompanies it. Especially in
Ecce Homo and Zarathusthra, the theme Foster dwells on, of seeking a unity
of thinking and feeling, takes the form of reversing older priorities. Ideas
do not control feelings but express them. So, if the philosopher wants
to capture the true hierarchy of forces in our actions, he must become what
I call a philosopher of literal states of feeling. On the dramatic level Nietzsche
constructs a style of inquiry where the mind tries to dwell within its own
unmediated emotional demands. Instead of interpreting emotions, Nietzsche
explores the emotions that drive the interpretive will. In doing that he
liberates all reflective media-music, painting, and writing-by illustrating the
imaginative desire inherent in making, but he also reinforces the guilt and terror
that accompany any refusal to live out such a vision of authenticity, however
good the rationale for moderation. Gide and Mann may be most influenced by
Nietzsche not in their cultural criticism but in their uneasy attitude towards
their own efforts to rationalize their own plight by trusting any ideas at all.
And the psychological literalness of texts as diverse as the Circe chapter in
Ulysses and Deatb of Virgil may more truly participate in the Nietzschean
current than works which grapple with those puny characters, his II ideas."
Perhaps even more difficult than isolating the causal units of empiricist
inquiry about influence is deciding on what grounds one can speak of cause
at all. I do not mean to invoke Hume but to ask how one decides where
a figure like Nietzsche is in fact an influence and where he is simply another
strand woven into a historical carpet. I am moved to this question by the fact
that Foster at times faUs victim to the bane of all influence studies, the
tendency to attribute to a specific source what may be merely a shared cultural
condition. His reader begins to w-onder whether all modern conflicts between
order and passion need be attributed to Dionysus and Apollo or all renderings
of empty willfulness to Nietzschean ideas of decadence and nihilism. More
than historical accuracy is at stake. For the more we see stances as
partially symptomatic and not governed by conscious choice, the marc the whole
idea of influence as the rational exploitation of a legacy latent in Nietzsche seems
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terribly limited, psychologically and historically.

This point need not require

pure sociological analysis-Foster is compelling on the difficulties with this.
But it will demand a more flexible sense of the interplay of personal and
impersonal forces, determining and determined states of mind. That in turn
probably involves a more complex sense of modernism than Foster provides
because we need to know the contexts impinging on Nietzsche and creating
conditions that allow his work to remain contemporary for the novelists.
The question of contemporaneity, however, will not be resolved simply by
invoking historical contexts. The morc we probe it, especially in relation to the
need to understand the presentational and symptomatic features of Nietzsche's
work, the more we find it difficult to rely on the linear view of history required
for Foster's kind of influence study. On the simplest level it seems clearly inadequate to interpret Nietzsche's enduring influence as only the result of shared
historical conditions. But ~hat else gives him his force and allows us to continue
to respond to it while modifying our contemporary visions of Nietzsche? I
cannot answer this question, but I can suggest that at the least we need a
psychology which explains how writers from other eras can affect us. This,
in turn, requires a strongly synchronic orientation towards what texts preserve
and what contemporary insights allow us to claim to have been true of the
past. If one is more sympathetic than Foster to the images of the psyche
contained in the contemporary versions of Nietzsche provided by Derrida and
DeLeuze, one finds terms for getting at the expressive literalness, sense of
laughing ecstatic destruction, -and fascination with the inadequacy of our
efforts at rationality which Foster underplays. It is true that the modernists
lacked concepts for such phenomena, yet, as Foster argues but does not follow
up, who continues to read Nietzsche if they seek <C concepts"? The more concrete
the presentation, the more likely it is that contemporary critical languages can
contribute to our grasp of the past (at least once a sense of the past frees us
from being exclusively in their grasp). To put the point more generally, we
must learn to read Nietzsche in the way he managed to make his contemporary
situation a frame for understanding features of the past not apparent to the
agents but basic to their actions. For our discussion, the most important issue
at stake is the need for a critical language that can handle the investments basic
to identifying and struggling with another thinker. If empiricism will not
suffice, I think we must try to adopt for less ideological purposes the Lacanian
concept of the imaginary as it is elaborated in Althusser, Machery, and Jameson.
Nietzsche especially demands such work because his own psychic stage is
often filled by his submitting to the ultimate appeal and trap of power by
dreaming of how he will exert influence.
Nietzsche's lesson, in his own use of the past and in his effects, is that we
live at once within and beyond historical terms. Our actions also take place
against a typological backdrop and in view of successors who will clarify those
features of ourselves we could not see clearly. Thus wIuIe Foster is right to
emphasize Nietzsche's perspectivism, he should also sympathize with the
complex psyche that sought an understanding of perspective which would
partially deny the necessity of relativism it affirms. No fully human thinker
yields his vitality to a historicist empiricism. The best proof of this is the
feeling we get from books like Foster's which so fully understand a major
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figure's ideas that, as they look for sources, they in fact reverse the priorities.
Reading Fostcr I often felt that he was not so much identifying actual influences
as demonstrating how fully we can read modern fiction if we fully internalize
in our readings modes of attention exemplified in Nietzsche's work At his
richest Foster says less about the historical Nietzsche than about the permanent
Nietzsche who lives by determining what in history we can take as empirically
compelling. Nietzsche even offers ideas for interpreting this ycry stnngc
phenomenon, ideas ·whose concern \yith the power of constructed images may
be constitutive of modernist aproachcs to fiction.
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Alte17lative Pleasures: Postl'calist Fiction and The TTaditi01l by Philip Stcvick.
Urbana, Chicago, London: Thc University of Illinois Prcss, 1981. Pp. xii
156. $13.95.

+

HOriZ011S of Assent: A1odemis711, Post711odc1'llism m/d tbe ironic Imagination
by Alan Vlildc. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1981. Pr. xii
209. $15.00.

+

\iVhile postmodcrnist litcrature and its accomp:mying criticism moYc in marc
than one dircction, its strongest thrust against modernism aims at a redefinition
of thc nature of form and order in literaturc, of the relation of litcraturc to
the world, of the self or subject in rclation to others. Y Ct both the literature
and criticism of postmodernism continue to be shaped by the modernist
perception of the world as fragmcnted, random, contingent, disordered and
chaotic with the consequence that the self fecls radically alicnated from others
and a society bcreft of any common or communal yalues and faith. Sometimes
the modernist perception seems based all a reading of recent scientific theory.
somctimes on a Jiscomfiting reading of society :111<1 the morc radical ll1mTIllents
\\'ithin it. YVhatc\'cr the ~ase, m;dernisr \\:riters and their sllpportiT1f! critics
Y<llued a highl" ordered literanue of irOJw, l11\'th and symbol th:1t Lldicalk
probed the :lcJ;ths of the self and all too {reC]u~ntly absor'bcd charJeter imo 'a
reflexive aesthctic \'Crbal pattcrning.
Postmodernism and its 3ttcnd~mt criticism continues to \Yor);: within modernism's
perceptioll and metaphors of rC3lity, but rcjccts the depth of the subject,
!lnds delight in SurL1CCS, accepts ch:loS and llllilds it into forms which
nloril,c such perceptiolls. "-here the highl)' wrought modernist \1:orl, ~t(J()d in
(lpp()~iti(lI1 tn the \\·orld. ofrcll secking to rise Jbm'c its Ch:l()" through c:1rcfully
~lrucrurl'd ir(ln~·. thc po.mnodcrnist \\'ork m:!l,es fC1gllleT1t:1!i()!l p:lrt (If its form
:lilt! oft(:Il seeks to reducc the number of ~i!!IlS that distill~\li .. h it :1S :"In.
Pr(lfc~~(lrs Stl.Ticl, ~l!ld \\'ildc furrher in prm'()c;,i\'(, \\":1:'5 the ~CJlIr:ll thrmr of
1'(1q11l[lderni~r critici~rn and in their succc~s come to illu:-.rr.1tc the h{)l1nd:lfic~ oi
rh:lt criticism.
S;e\·ick. in .-11:aii.1ti:·~' PlonlTL·.f, SCts :\meric:m fiction of the bre ·si:·:tics
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and the decade Df the 'seventies against the background of both the realist and
modernist traditions. As opposed to past seriousnesses about the novel, contemporary fiction bases itself on the metaphor of fiction-as-game, as play.
This ludic impulse releases enormous energy and feeling and expresses itself in
a style which provides perceptions and knowledge unavailable in previous modes
of fiction.
For example, Stevick points out, contemporary fictionists use naive narrators
and forms of narration, not as Voltaire did, to satirize the naif's world view, nor
as Salinger did, to reveal the naif from the inside, but rather to create a
deliberately cartoon-like clarity of vision valorizing vulnerability and self-exposure.
The grim and depressing, even the awful and violent are, according to Stevick,
rendered tolerable through the "sweet and sometimes stupid voice which
speaks of them" (p. 93). Naivete, then) is not automatically funny) nOf a
distortion of mature experience, but a valid mode of perceiving, and, more
importantly, of being in the world.
Similarly for Stevick the lrind of characters and the feeling expressed for
them signals postmodernism)s different relationship with the world. Modernism
congealed around Sattre's metaphor that hell is other people and took an
attitude that Stevick characterizes as "ironic scorn)) toward professionals and the
lower classes. Contemporary fiction not only introduces such characters, but
treats them with an "unreserved sensual pleasure, in living in the world,
different from anything in the decades before" (p. 54). Further, recent
writers treated such characters and the events in their lives with tenderness
and sentiment. Such willingness to display feelings and attitudes uncharacteristic
of modernism reduces the distance benveen authors and their creations, benveen
audience and character and finally between author, work, and audience.
Often enough these fictions are filled with what Stevick calls "mock-fact"
and "dreck 11 (images from commercial culture), not to establish verisimilitude
as with the realists, nor to create a reflexive, aesthetically coherent symbol
system, as with the moderns, but rather to mock the whole enterprise of
erecting a fictive world so central to both realists and modernists. The result
is the release of inventive and comic energy "reflecting an ambivalent
evaluation of the things of this world" (p. 133).
These elements are often combined in works that give the appearance of
traditional satire; but, Stevick argues, that satire has no object, no normative
values. To paraphrase Nathaniel West, whom Stevick quotes: "there is
nothing in these works to root for, and what is worse, no rooters 11 (pp. 120, 121).
Such satire demonstrates, Stevick claims, "the pleasure and power of a free
invention that looks like satire, but elevates its own stylized vision above its
author's wish to direct our judgments" (p. 121). The energy of style, then,
takes its place with the naif, the vulnerable, the nonjudgmental, in Stevick's
characterization of postmodernist fiction in America.
In H orizolls of Assent, Wilde focuses on the theme of irony in modernist
and postmodernist fiction. Conventional literary irony, whose locus is satire,
implies, according to Wilde, that where there is fragmentation, chaos, debasement, and stupidity, there once was unity, form, order, elevation, 2nd intelligence. In short, conventional literary irony, here called "mediate" irony,
implies the existence of a metaphysical and religious order; it looked back
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toward Eden, or upward toward heaven to find its norms. In contrast to this
irony modernism developed "disjunctive" irony which posits no Eden or
heaven, but rather uses irony to order the fragmented and chaotic world it
perceives. This irony seeks to create a literature in which equal and opposed
possibilities are held in a state of total poise. At its apex, this irony becomes
" absolute" irony, the irony of high modernism.
Dialectically, however, this irony contains its opposites, termed by Wilde the
" anironic." The anironic of absolute irony, gives rise to a desire not only
for fusion, but also for participation in the world, rather than for hovering above
it, savoring aesthetic paradox. The anironic in Wilde is close to Stevick's
sentiment, but he feels the latter term cannot be effectively reintroduced to
critical discourse, so laden is it with pejorative connotation. Further, Wilde
argues, the move away from modernist irony finally reflects that movement's
failure to come to terms with experience.
Absolute irony then, generates a new form of irony Wilde calls '~suspensive."
TIlls irony is an integrative gesture toward the world. In the words of Jerzy
Kosinski (whom Wilde quotes) suspensive irony provides" a true sense of the
randomness of life's moments, [and] man is at peace with himself" (p. 10).
Suspensive irony, ,",vithout diminishing the modernist sense of the world's
fragmentation, participates in the world, finds ways of enjoying "the smaller
pleasures." The bulk of Wilde's book traces in astute and provocative readings
the developments of this irony in the works of Forster, Isherwood, ComptonBurnett, Sukenick, Federman, Elkin, and Barthe1me.
Interestingly, in an argument that needs full-fledged development, Wilde
roots irony in perception, in the body. With Merleau-Ponty he claims
that there exists" a natal pact between ourselves and the world, between ourselves
and the body" (p. 29). By rooting irony in the body, Wilde not only makes
it a pre-critical and pre-conceptual response, but begins to develop a materialist
theory of irony. He concurs with the spleen in l\1ax Apple's story "Free
Agents" which asserts: "Now it's the body's turn to come into the twentieth
century" (p. 132). Wilde approaches the insight of Fusto Maijstral, the
Maltese poet in Fynchon's V who believes that art is neither a communication
with angels nor the unconscious, but "with the guts, genitals and five portals
of sense." For Wilde, irony is the body's response to doubleness, to fragmentation and that response enables postmodernist irony to enter into the
world.
Stevick and Wilde are aware of the negative criticism of postmodernist
fiction and its interpretors. The" cultivation," says Stevick, "of a range of
verbal activities that in another period might be called cuteness, cleverness, or
mere facility and worse" (p. 45) has brought postInodernism under fire.
Wilde points out that reductive postmodernism (represented for him by
aspects of Sukenick and Gass), while scorning "the modernist desire to recover
original wholeness," nevertheless imposes "on unpatterned reality the squamousness of the abstracting mind" (p. 144) and comes close to repeating the
aestheticism of the early part of the century. "Or," Wilde asserts, "one
should say that aestheticism is the master sign under which much that is
reductive in contemporary culture coalesces" (p. 144).
Correct in their assessment of the dangers of aestheticism, these critics stop
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short of an analysis that reveals the root cause of that tendency in both
modernism and postmodernism. Put simply, the modernist rhetorical cluster
for describing the world-chaos, fragmentation, randomness-is at best ambiguous and at worst mystifying. In its baldest forms this cluster implies that
not only are the universe and nature contingent and random, but that social
processes are finally uninterpretable and therefore unchangeable. Acceptance
of that cluster deprives the world and society of meaning, further isolating the
self. In this relationship energy and style or ironic gestures become significant
responses. But changes in style are just that because there is no designated
agency of social change and we move randomly from one style to another.
Pynchon's Fausto knew well the effect of bombs on metaphors and bodies,
and Elkin's Boswell, breaking the lock on the Colloseum door the better to be
seduced by the Principessa, learns of the effects of money on the body and its
attendant metaphors. If the criticism of which Stevick and Wilde form a part
is to move forward, it must begin a critique of the rhetoric \.Vith which modernism and postmodernism describe the world; in particular if it is determined to
participate in the world, it must come to understand the effects of bombs and
money, war and work on the body and on the language of literature. Postmodernist fiction, however energetic, sentimental or anironic, and stylish, can
only provide us with mythologies in Roland Barthes' sense of the term. The
central processes and structure of the social world are anonymous and the
relationship between the social world and the language of literature remains
mystified. If postmodernism is to move toward the world and give us more
than myths of adjustment, it must encounter the relationship between the
language of literature and the language we use to discuss social, political, and
economic processes. That is the task for
postmodernist criticism in which

Wilde and Stevick will hopefully share.
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